Action and Responsibility
Andrew Sneddon
What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions.
年:
2005
出版:
1
出版社:
Springer
语言:
english
页:
200
ISBN 10:
1402039964
ISBN 13:
9781402039966
系列:
Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy
文件:
PDF, 668 KB
IPFS:
,
english, 2005